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T
he U.S. Supreme Court handed down its ruling in 
the inal trademark case of the 2019–20 term in U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Ofice v. Booking.com B.V.1 on 
June 30, 2020. In an 8–1 decision authored by Justice 
Ginsburg, the majority held that consumer perception 
alone should determine whether terms are registrable 
as trademarks or generic and free for all to use.
The issue was whether a term that is generic for the class of 
goods or services can be protected as a trademark when followed 
by “.com.” The U.S. Patent and Trademark Ofice (USPTO) 
refused to register BOOKING.COM in four related applica-
tions for travel reservation services, inding that “booking” was 
generic for these services and that the addition of the generic 
top-level domain (gTLD) “.com” failed to cure the problem as 
a matter of law. After unsuccessfully appealing the trademark 
examining attorney’s refusal in the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board, the applicant sued the Director of the USPTO in district 
court, likely as a means to escape unfavorable Federal Circuit 
precedent, where an appeal could have been made. The district 
court, hearing the case de novo and declaring it a case of irst 
impression in the Fourth Circuit, ruled that a generic term plus a 
gTLD creates a merely descriptive mark and that Booking.com 
had acquired secondary meaning. The inding that the mark was 
descriptive with acquired distinctiveness, but not the per se rule, 
was afirmed by the Fourth Circuit.2
At the Supreme Court, Booking.com did not contest that 
“booking” is generic for the services it offers, and the USPTO 
did not contest the secondary meaning evidence proffered by 
Booking.com showing that consumers do not perceive “book-
ing.com” to be generic. The case then was simply about the 
proper test for genericity in “generic.com” cases. The USPTO 
argued the rule in generic.com cases should follow the rule that 
the addition of “Inc.” or “Co.” to generic terms does not cre-
ate a composite that is not generic. This rule was established in 
an 1888 Supreme Court precedent—Goodyear’s India Rubber 
Glove Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.3—that held 
that a generic term embellished only by the generic designation 
of a business entity necessarily produces a generic composite.
In its irst domain name case, which was also the irst case 
in which the Court had ever permitted a live audio recording 
of oral argument, the Court disagreed. Holding that “[a] term 
styled ‘generic.com’ is a generic name for a class of goods 
or services only if the term has that meaning to consumers,” 
the Court ruled that the USPTO must base its decision on evi-
dence of consumer perception and not on any other rule.4 The 
USPTO had argued that the consumer perception inquiry was 
unnecessary in this case just as it had been in Goodyear.
Goodbye Goodyear
The Court did not explicitly overrule Goodyear but chose 
not to apply it. This case was distinguishable, it reasoned, 
because only one entity can occupy a particular domain 
name. Thus, while there could be several entities calling 
themselves “Wine Co.,” there can be only one wine.com. This 
distinction is not a logical distinction, but a factual distinc-
tion. It presumes that consumers know that under our federal 
system, corporate law is governed by state law so that dif-
ferent companies can register the same corporate name in 
different states, but under the technical rules of the domain 
name system, only one entity may register that name in .com. 
This factual distinction is then the basis for an argument that 
consumers would perceive a “generic.com” differently than 
they would perceive a “Generic Corp.,” but it is not a pol-
icy rationale for evading the Court’s previous decision. The 
majority, however, resisted the implications of this factual 
distinction. If it is signiicant that there can be only one wine.
com, presumably that is because consumers will understand 
the exclusivity conveyed by such a designation. It is curious 
then that the Court stated that it did “not embrace a rule auto-
matically classifying such terms as nongeneric.”5
The Court supplemented this distinction with an interpreta-
tion of Goodyear that clashed with the USPTO’s. The USPTO 
understood Goodyear to pronounce a rule that a generic term 
supplemented only by a generic corporate designation could 
not produce a protectable mark as a matter of law. Characteriz-
ing such a rule as “unyielding,” the Court noted that it “entirely 
disregards consumer perception,” which the Court stated is a 
“bedrock principle of the Lanham Act.”6 Instead, the Court saw 
the Goodyear rule as “a more modest principle harmonious 
with Congress’ subsequent enactment” of the Lanham Act.7 
The Court suggested that a rule “incompatible” with consumer 
confusion is therefore incompatible with the Lanham Act. 
Booking.com had argued that Goodyear was “repudiated” by 
the Lanham Act.8 The Court declined such a pronouncement, 
but suggested that any rule that doesn’t yield to consumer per-
ception has been repudiated.
The rule Goodyear announced does not yield to consumer 
confusion. Goodyear declared:
[P]arties united to produce or sell wine, or to raise cotton or 
grain, might style themselves Wine Company, Cotton Com-
pany, or Grain Company; but by such description they would 
in no respect impair the equal right of others engaged in simi-
lar business to use similar designations . . . . Names of such 
articles cannot be adopted as trade-marks . . . ; nor will the 
incorporation of a company in the name of an article of com-
merce, without other speciication, create any exclusive right 
to the use of the name.9
The Court thus stated that the adoption of a “Generic Corp.” can-
not be an adopted trademark as a matter of law. Had there been 
evidence indicating that “Goodyear Rubber Company” was not 
understood by consumers as generic, the result would have been 
the same. The Court stated that “[t]he designation Goodyear 
Rubber Company not being subject to exclusive appropriation” 
could be freely employed by others.10 It was a formulation that 
was not subject to appropriation regardless of the facts.
The Goodyear Court’s rule is thus incompatible with the 
Booking.com rule: “Whether any given ‘generic.com’ term 
is generic, we hold, depends on whether consumers in fact 
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perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term 
capable of distinguishing among members of the class.”11 The 
Court thus silently overruled Goodyear.
The Customer Is Always Right
Signiicantly, the Court’s broad statement that following 
Congress’s enactment of the Lanham Act all rules must be 
compatible with consumer perception cites no authority 
within Congress’s enactment for such a changed standard. 
Indeed, the Lanham Act offers no citable language for this 
proposition. In fact, the Lanham Act makes consumer per-
ception subservient to other doctrines, such as the absolute 
registration bars (deceptive marks, lags, etc.), and certain 
defenses, such as fair use and laches.
Booking.com convinced the Court that the Goodyear rule 
was odious. In its briefs and oral argument, the rule was disap-
provingly characterized as a “per se” rule, a classiication taken 
up by the majority. Booking.com also effectively denigrated 
the precedent as being too old. In the oral argument, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts twice noted that the Goodyear case was 130 years 
old and pointedly asked why we would now focus on it.12 Like-
wise, Justice Alito, noting that Goodyear was “from a different 
era,” asked for a rule “that makes sense in the Internet age.”13 
Also echoing Booking.com’s argument, the Court noted its 
inconsistent application by the USPTO and stated that its adop-
tion could therefore put issued registrations in peril.
None of this, however, gives the Court license to ignore its 
own precedent. Goodyear is far from out of date; it perfectly 
captures the issue of claiming trademark rights in domain 
names. The rule advanced by the USPTO is an extension of 
Goodyear for the internet age. The Court, however, gave itself 
license to ignore Goodyear with this statement: “we discern 
no support for the [Goodyear rule] in trademark law or pol-
icy.”14 Therein lies the importance of this case going forward. 
Goodyear is a part of current trademark law, and its rule rests 
entirely on trademark policy. The policy it espouses is trade-
mark law’s protection of competition. For the majority, that 
policy had no purchase in this case. Harm to competition just 
wasn’t tangible. In the void, the Court latched on to consumer 
perception as the driver of trademark policy.
Goodyear was concerned with the monopolization of a 
generic term by a Generic Co. Meanwhile, the majority in 
Booking.com was convinced by Booking.com that attempts 
to assert exclusive rights in generic.coms were “losers.”15 
Booking.com also promised that if it received a registra-
tion, it would not enforce it against similar domains. Both the 
majority and dissent referred to this promise and cited it in 
the oral argument transcript, presumably to make it binding? 
That plus $5 will get a competitor a cup of coffee while it 
reads the cease and desist letter it will receive from Booking.
com for using a similar domain. Booking.com also convinced 
the majority not only that highly descriptive terms result in 
thin trademarks, but also that the doctrine of descriptive fair 
use adequately protects competition. If in fact the trademark 
offers Booking.com such weak rights, one wonders why it 
chose to pay to litigate a registration refusal all the way to the 
Supreme Court when it already claims common-law rights in 
the designation, holds related registrations in design marks, 
holds 85 registrations for Booking.com worldwide (each of 
which can be relied on in a domain name dispute), and has 
secured the domain name. If all it really wanted was a thin 
trademark, it could have more easily achieved that by simply 
disclaiming the generic term in a stylized mark.
Justice Breyer, the sole dissenter, was also the sole link to 
all of the Court’s precedent protecting competition. Interest-
ingly, Justices Ginsberg and Breyer often found themselves 
on opposite sides in intellectual property cases. Breyer saw 
the monopoly danger and issued one of his most tight and 
convincing opinions.
Goodyear, the USPTO, and Justice Breyer all saw a dan-
ger that the majority did not. Just as a company selling wine 
should not be able to own a trademark in “wine,” neither 
should it be able to do an end run around that prohibition by 
adopting the moniker “Wine Co.” To allow a trademark in 
such cases, according to Goodyear, would “impair the equal 
right of others engaged in similar business to use similar des-
ignations, for the obvious reason that all persons have a right 
to deal in such articles, and to publish the fact to the world.”16 
In sharp contrast, the Booking.com majority concluded that 
the USPTO’s concern about granting “undue control over 
similar language, i.e., ‘booking,’ that others should remain 
free to use . . . attends any descriptive mark,” and “[r]espon-
sive to it, trademark law hems in the scope of such marks 
short of denying trademark protection altogether.”17 The 
majority seems not even to ind a policy justiication for the 
law’s distinction between generic and descriptive terms. The 
equivalent in patent law would be giving up § 101 of the 
Patent Act on the assurance that § 102 and § 103 would pro-
tect the public domain. Or perhaps Booking.com goes even 
further, suggesting that subject matter constraints are unnec-
essary when effective constraints exist on the scope of rights.
Having Its Cake and Eating the Competition Too
Although the decision was not surprising, it was nonethe-
less disappointing. In elevating the public policy work that 
consumer perception does in trademark law, the Court has 
opened the door to monopolizing generic terms, especially 
to large companies. Justice Breyer’s dissent was spot on. 
In deciding that a generic.com can be registered as a trade-
mark if it has a source-identifying meaning to consumers, 
the Supreme Court allows Booking.com to have its cake and 
eat it too. In registering www.booking.com, the online book-
ing company monopolized the generic word for its services 
in .com, and in adopting the domain name as its business 
name, it immediately conveyed to consumers the services 
it provides. Other advantages follow, including a conspicu-
ous web presence and—as a result of recent domain name 
system rules—the sole right to own the term as its own top-
level domain: .booking. The usual consequence of adopting 
a business name that does no more than convey the services 
provided is that the name can’t be registered as a trade-
mark; a trade-off many would accept. But the Supreme Court 
removed that consequence and cleared the way for Booking.
com to also eat its cake.
Preserving competition is the basis of the trademark rule 
against monopolizing generic terms. Booking.com is already one 
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of the largest online travel agencies in the world. It is owned by 
Booking Holdings Inc., which also owns many of the other book-
ing websites, including Priceline.com, Agoda.com, Kayak.com, 
Cheaplights, Rentalcars.com, Momondo, and OpenTable.18 The 
company has had antitrust issues in the European Union, U.K., 
and Turkey.19 In the U.S., it already owns the trademark VILLAS.
COM,20 and it purchased the domain and priority rights to BOOK-
INGS.COM, which now simply redirects to booking.com. In 
addition to owning the gTLD .booking, the company also owns 
the gTLD .hotels.21 This is not a company that invites competition.
Survey Says: Problems Ahead
The USPTO is on a Supreme Court losing streak in trademark 
law. Since 2017, including the instant decision, the USPTO has 
lost all three of the cases it appealed to the Court.22 In Booking.
com, one may wonder why the USPTO seemed to have put all 
of its eggs into the basket of precedent as it argued only that 
the Goodyear rule should apply; it had no alternative argument. 
In oral argument, Justices Kagan and Gorsuch both asked the 
USPTO for an alternative to the per se rule. By not challenging 
the district court’s factual indings, the USPTO seems to have 
chosen an all-or-nothing approach.
Anyone who has thought about how generic terms are iden-
tiied by the USPTO will understand why this was a necessary 
litigation strategy. Goodyear was not just a preferred rule for 
the USPTO—it was the only practical rule to prohibit the reg-
istration of generic.coms. Under the USPTO proposed rule, 
survey evidence is irrelevant. As a result of Booking.com, the 
USPTO will now have to contend with survey evidence of 
consumer perception in generic.com cases. But what can the 
USPTO—in the form of a single examiner—do to counter such 
evidence? If a company has the resources to introduce survey 
evidence that a generic.com is not perceived by consumers as 
generic, the USPTO will not be in the position that a court is 
in when genericism is litigated between two parties. It will not 
have the beneit of considering counterevidence in the form of 
an alternate survey or a survey expert’s critique.
A critical issue going forward will be how to ensure that 
the survey evidence indicates proper consumer perception 
because not all consumer perception evidence is relevant. The 
doctrine of “de facto secondary meaning” holds that once a 
designation has been determined to be generic, no amount 
of consumer recognition can transform its status into that of 
a protected mark. As Judge Friendly, author of the oft-cited 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. decision that 
made doctrinal sense of generic terms, stated:
[E]ven proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some 
“merely descriptive” marks may be registered, cannot trans-
form a generic term into a subject for trademark. . . . [N]o 
matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term 
has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and 
what success it has achieved in securing public identiication, 
it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of 
the right to call an article by its name.23
Under this rule, if booking.com was generic when the 
domain was irst used, the fact that the owner of that 
website has now convinced consumers that the designation 
is its brand name is irrelevant.
The inluential McCarthy treatise notes that the danger in 
being too accepting of survey evidence would “allow spuri-
ous claims of trademark status for generic names based on 
shaky and unreliable evidence of customer perception.”24 
McCarthy cautions that “[i]f courts were not scrupulous in 
weighing the evidence, this could constitute a large loophole 
in the classic rule against ownership of generic names,” and 
“the way for a court to handle such a case is to consider the 
proof of customer perception that the trademark proponent 
puts into evidence and to balance it against the public policy 
of open competition and free use of generic names.”25 The 
work of examiners in evaluating survey evidence in generic 
cases is considerable, but their tools are few.
Where a private party seeks to invalidate a mark as generic, 
it is better positioned than the USPTO to undermine survey 
evidence with conlicting evidence, which may include expert 
opinion on survey design and additional surveys. Because 
the USPTO can’t hire experts or commission surveys, it can-
not effectively guard the public domain in the absence of a per 
se rule. What the USPTO can do in lieu of a survey is comb 
databases and list the generic uses of the term at issue. But 
in the case of a generic.com, there necessarily will be less of 
this evidence because competitor use may be nonexistent. For 
example, Booking.com’s competitors routinely use “booking,” 
but they don’t use “booking.com” because any reference to a 
domain name provides consumers with not only the address 
of the competition but also a nonstop free shuttle ride to their 
place of business. Thus, in evaluating the evidence in the case 
of a generic.com, the USPTO must guard against the public 
domain with both of its arms tied behind its back.
Defeating De Facto Secondary Meaning
A straightforward method for the USPTO to deal with sur-
vey evidence and weed out de facto secondary meaning is 
to sort it by the date it was created. Booking.com’s survey 
showing 74.8 percent of respondents recognized the domain 
name as a brand name was not conducted until 2016, after it 
had long used and heavily advertised the mark.26 Indeed, the 
company’s briefs and expert reports recount an extraordinary 
effort—especially in the ive years prior to the survey—to 
create brand awareness.27 So did the 2016 survey measure the 
original understanding of booking.com or de facto secondary 
meaning? If the latter, the USPTO needs a workable means to 
discount—or even ignore—this evidence, such as a rebuttable 
presumption that it is evidence of de facto secondary mean-
ing based on its date of creation. For the USPTO to otherwise 
simply accept survey evidence would create, in the words of 
McCarthy, “a large loophole in the classic rule against owner-
ship of generic names.”
The hypothetical “washingmachine.com” exposes the vul-
nerability in the majority’s ruling. Invented as a control in 
Booking.com’s survey—no washingmachine.com website 
or company exists—30 percent of respondents nonetheless 
identiied it as a brand.28 But the percent indicates that only a 
minority view a domain name as a brand; the majority—60.8 
percent—believed washingmachine.com was generic.29 Under 
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the majority’s consumer perception rule, these facts indicate 
that washingmachine.com is generic.
The key question then is what accounts for the 44.8 percent 
difference in brand recognition between washingmachine.com 
and booking.com. What other than de facto secondary meaning 
can explain these results? If washingmachine.com were operated 
by a company that invested an advertising budget comparable 
to Booking.com and created a comparable user base, it would 
also likely see a 44.8 percent boost in brand recognition. If said 
washingmachine.com were allowed to introduce such survey 
evidence, it would thereby be enabled to overcome its generic 
designation with de facto secondary meaning.
The majority didn’t attend to this vulnerability likely 
because it assumed that booking.com was not generic when 
irst used based on its belief that consumers think domains nec-
essarily indicate single entities. That assumption, however, is 
undermined by the washingmachine.com survey results that 
60.8 percent thought it was generic. The majority’s assumption 
was supported to some extent—30 percent thought it was a 
brand for no apparent reason. These respondents were presum-
ably reacting to the .com sufix since 100 percent of the survey 
respondents identiied “supermarket” as generic. Still, the 
majority’s assumption is belied by the majority of respondents.
The majority’s assumption that generic.coms are under-
stood as indicating a single entity may also be based on the 
belief that consumers would never utter a generic.com except 
to refer to a single entity. In oral argument, Chief Justice 
Roberts observed that “nobody refers to [travel booking sites] 
as Booking.coms,”30 and the majority similarly observed that 
a consumer would never “ask a frequent traveler to name 
her favorite ‘Booking.com.’”31 And yet, Booking.com’s own 
lawyer demonstrated in oral arguments just how a consumer 
would do this unthinkable act when stating, “I have searched 
every grocerystore.com looking for toilet paper. I have now 
started looking at every hardware.com.”32
This reliance on assumed consumer understanding of 
generic.coms is yet another example of the contrasting view-
points between the Booking.com Court and the Goodyear 
Court. Under Booking.com’s reasoning, “Wine Corp.” can be 
registered because there is no genus of goods that consum-
ers commonly refer to as “wine corp.” The Goodyear Court 
was not focused on consumer use, but instead loopholes in 
the generic prohibition. Its rule effectively prevented a wine 
seller who couldn’t register “wine” from registering “Wine 
Co.” because of its interest in protecting competition regard-
less of consumer understanding.
When You Know Who’s Going to Win at Monopoly 
but You Have to Keep Playing
The policy question at the heart of this case is whether the 
prohibition on registering generic terms is worth it. If it is, it 
should be worth not creating a loophole that you could sail a 
cruise ship through. If it is, it should be worth tolerating the 
inlexibility of a per se rule. If it is, it should even be worth 
ignoring current consumer perception.
With its Booking.com decision, not only did the Supreme 
Court effectively overrule one of its own precedents, but 
it also reversed the established rule that generic.coms are 
unprotectable. Both the dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit 
decision and the McCarthy treatise state that the USPTO’s per 
se rule was the accepted position.33 These reversals have now 
made generic.coms much more valuable than they already 
were.34 The heretofore unexpected trademark rights that can 
now low from a generic.com will create a renewed market 
interest in these domains. The irony is that the newly minted 
top-level domains, such as .car, .travel, and .holiday, have been 
made available as a means of escaping the hold of .com.35 This 
decision will enhance the magnetic force of .com.
Generic.coms present an even greater risk of monop-
oly powers than a Generic Corp. does. As the dissent in the 
Fourth Circuit correctly stated, “[t]his case addresses a prob-
lem that Booking.com chose to bring upon itself.”36 The 
adoption of a generic term as a trademark always involves a 
problem of the applicant’s own creation. Now, however, in 
the case of a generic.com, the applicant gets to have it both 
ways without having to make the usual trade-off between 
trademark rights and instant communication of the business 
offerings. Whereas the doctrine of trademark genericity fol-
lows the saying that you can’t have your cake and eat it too, 
the Booking.com rule allows a generic.com that purchases a 
pricey cake to grab the key to the bakery. n
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